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1. PRELIMINARY QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION AND 
JUDGMENT OF RELEVANCE 
 Over the last few years administrative justice has displayed an increasing interest 
in the use of references submitted for preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (art. 267, par. 3, TFEU) and in current relations between the aforesaid 
institution and national procedural rules. 
The Italian Council of State has even made use of the instrument in question for the 
very purpose of obtaining clarifications from the European judge regarding procedures 
relating to its practice, and regarding the scope of its own assessment of admissibility when 
request for referral is submitted by the claimant. 
As a rule, requests formulated by the party to the proceedings oblige the supreme 
court judge to make preliminary reference when these concern questions of interpretation of 
European Union law, questions which are fundamental to making a ruling on the judgment, 
or questions not completely identical to others already ruled on by the Court of Justice, as 
well as questions on which the correct application of European Union law “is not so obvious 
as to leave no room for any reasonable doubt on the solution to be applied to the questions 
raised”. 
The Italian administrative judge has, nonetheless, identified a possible conflict 
between the obligation to refer and national procedural rules which would render 
inadmissible questions submitted with insufficient relevance. 
The Council of State criticises the formulating of questions in generic terms, or those 
referring to patently irrelevant European Union norms which would lead to a ruling of 
irrelevance or of inadmissibility or, alternatively, a complete reformulation of the interpretive 
question by the judge. 
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Other limits on preliminary reference derive from Italian procedural law: the generic 
nature of the normative parameter invoked; the improper use of the preliminary reference 
with which a solution to the specific case is asked of the Court of Justice; the formulation of 
questions using elements of the specific case, on occasion not reconstructed impartially; the 
confusing of question of “interpretation of European Union law” and  application of the same 
law in the case at issue. 
The Council of State ponders the scope of its own judgment of admissibility of the 
preliminary question and laments the reduction of its powers of evaluation (or of “filter”) vis-
à-vis the claimant's request: preliminary reference could only be denied if the  European 
Union Law norm is clear beyond all reasonable doubt.  
Since art. 267, par. 3, TFEU establishes the obligation to refer if the party raises a 
preliminary question. It would appear that the national judge has no power to establish 
whether “the community law is clear” and raises no doubts over interpretation. Here, the 
Council of State could not therefore refuse a preliminary reference, as it could for a question 
of  constitutional legitimacy. 
In some cases the Court of Justice criticises the lack of relevance of the question 
which has in error been raised by the national judge. 
It is not, however, clear what scope the national judge has to reject relevance, when  
to evaluate the relevance it is, in any event, necessary to establish whether  European Union 
Law is applicable in the case at issue. Nor is it clear what the legal consequences are should 
the national judge reject the relevance of the question of interpretation of European Union 
law, having wrongly judged whether this is applicable or not to the case in point. 
 
2. PRECLUSIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIALS AND 
OBLIGATORY PRELIMINARY REFERENCE 
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It is necessary to identify those principles of the Italian administrative trial which 
may come into conflict with the obligation to submit a preliminary reference to the Court of 
Justice. 
A request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the appellant may be seen as grounds 
of appeal:  “grounds of appeal” on the basis of national procedural rules. Thus, the evaluation 
of the very request  for a preliminary ruling, constituting, as it does, “grounds of appeal”, 
must respect the principle of the specificity of the formulation (generic grounds are 
inadmissible), and that according to which grounds may not be altered once the proceedings 
are underway. 
If the claimant wishes to challenge the administrative act contested as being in 
conflict with European Union Law, without treating the same criticism as “grounds of 
appeal”, at this point his conduct would be in violation of the principles of the Italian 
Administrative Trial Code. 
The claimant would, in fact, be making improper use of the question of 
interpretation of EU law, without clarifying and defining the scope of the question submitted. 
The query submitted to the European Union Judge produces a rigid alternative: 
1) the primacy of EU law prevails over national procedural systems and thus dictates 
that the judge, even in infringement of national procedural rules, must interpret, amend and 
adapt the application by the party, in such a way that the preliminary query raised by the 
party complies with the relevant prerequisites, both in form and in substance; 
2) or, alternatively, national procedural autonomy prevails and the judge may not 
correct and modify the application by the party or avoid undue reference without liability for 
violation of art. 267, par. 3, TFEU. 
According to the Council of State, the obligation to submit a preliminary reference 
would not hinder critical evaluation, on the part of the a quo judge, of the question of 
interpretation of European Union law, permitting him to avoid referring the question should 
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he deem, on the basis of a parameter of reasonableness and  professional diligence, that the 
European norm is “reasonably clear” and does not require further clarification. 
There remains, however, doubt and interpretations conflict. The administrative 
judge, in an original way, formulates an alternative preliminary interpretive question. He 
drafts a “main” referral for the eventuality that the Court of Justice accepts the thesis of the 
“wide mesh filter” and in this instance the preliminary question is that formulated by the 
claimant. He also puts forward a “subordinate” question, as evidenced by the reformulation 
of the application by the party, drafted by the Council of State itself. 
 
3. REPERCUSSIONS ON THE REASONABLE LENGTH OF THE 
TRIAL AND ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDGE IN THE EVENT 
OF FAILURE TO REFER 
Other questions of interpretation concern the compatibility of the obligation  to delay 
proceedings with the principle of reasonable length of  trial, as ratified by Italian law, by 
European Union Law itself and by international conventional law. The administrative judge 
wishes to know whether a lengthening of trial duration may lead to the reference and 
preliminary ruling stage at the CJEU being excluded from the calculation of trial length. 
Clarification is sought regarding instances in which failure to submit a preliminary 
reference would give rise to a “manifest violation of community law”, and whether this 
notion may be of different scope and application with regard to  special proceedings against 
the State for “compensation for damage caused in the exercise of judicial functions and civil 
liability of  judges” and of general proceedings against the State for violation of community 
law. Such clarification would go some way towards avoiding the situation where  national 
judges, for fear of violating community law, burden the Court of Justice with merely 
“defensive” referrals designed to  prevent civil liability suits against judges. 
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The Council of State is seeking clarifications, following the recent ruling by the 
Court of Justice challenging the validity of the Italian law on the civil liability of judges, 
deeming the limitations on liability provided for therein to be contrary to EU law. 
The recent intervention by the Italian legislature to amend the regulations regarding 
the civil liability of judges confirms the concerns of the Council of State, where it states that 
“in the event of a manifest violation of European Union law one must also take into account 
not only the non-observance of the obligation to submit a preliminary reference in accordance 
with article  267, paragraph three, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
but also the conflict of the act or provision with  the interpretation  expressed  by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union”. 
 
4. THE RESPONSE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE: THE 
REFERRAL JUDGE, “MASTER” OF THE RELEVANCE OF THE 
QUESTION 
With regard to the evaluation of the relevance of the question of interpretation, the 
national judge is master. There remain doubts on the scope of such an evaluation, also in 
terms of the applicability of the European norm to the judgment pending to which the party 
to the proceedings makes reference. The Italian administrative judge is bound by the grounds 
of the parties, and this may therefore induce the judge himself, in debatable cases, to extend 
the range of preliminary reference; above all with regard to the framing of the specific case  
with regard to the specific case outlined by the supranational source. 
The crucial point regards the use of the preliminary reference as grounds of appeal, 
regulated by national procedural norms on application by the party. 
The Court of Justice itself has, in the last few years, stated that the dispositive 
principle in the administrative trial forbids the national judge to raise on his own initiative 
grounds founded on the violation of community norms, without this conflicting with the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness of legal protection. This does not preclude the 
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administrative judge from raising questions on his own initiative provided that the principle 
of the adversarial process is respected. 
The European Union judge reiterates that the identification and  formulation of 
questions to be submitted to the CJEU are a matter for the national judge, and that the 
litigating parties in the main proceedings may not modify their scope. The national judge is 
at liberty to invite the litigating parties to suggest formulations in the drafting of the 
preliminary questions but only the judge himself may decide on the form and content of the 
questions.  
The Court of Justice expresses itself tersely on “national procedural rules”, which  
the Council of State had invoked “without, however, clarifying their exact scope”: for the 
Court it is sufficient to call to mind that “such norms cannot reduce the competence and the 
obligations incumbent upon a national judge in his capacity as  judge of referral in accordance 
with article 267 TFEU”. 
Such an interpretation allows the Court of Justice to avoid tackling any possible 
effect of the principle of reasonable length of  trial, since the question was only formulated 
for the eventuality in which article 267 TFEU should be taken to mean that it imposes upon 
the national supreme court judge an unconditional obligation to submit a preliminary 
reference of a question of interpretation of the law of the Union, raised by one of the litigating 
parties. 
 
5.  PRELIMINARY RELEVANCE QUESTION AND FAIR 
COOPERATION AMONG JUDGES 
Even before the pronouncement of the Judge of the European Union in response to 
the queries formulated, Section V of the Council of State rejected any notion of the existence 
of an obligation to refer to the Court of Justice the question of interpretation of a community 
norm, when this is not deemed relevant in coming to a ruling, or when it deems that an acte 
clair is present, which, in light of the existence of previous rulings of the Court, or of the 
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obviousness of the interpretation, renders preliminary reference superfluous (or not 
obligatory). 
In this case too, nonetheless, the administrative judge was able to establish the 
irrelevance of the question put forward, it not being relevant in terms of the thema 
decidendum, without, however, touching on the problem of the use of the preliminary 
reference as grounds of appeal. 
In one case, indeed, the prerequisites to raise a question for preliminary reference 
before the Court of Justice in relation to compatibility of the measures with the founding 
treaty. In a further case, refusal to refer was based on the “clarity, unequivocal nature and 
patency of a correct application of community law”. 
Finally the Council of State has ruled out the existence of an unconditional right  of  
individual citizens always to see a preliminary question of interpretation on the part of a 
supreme court raised. 
The Court of Justice's sensibilities have changed somewhat as regards the 
admissibility of  preliminary references not adequately justified. 
Criticisms concern the formerly “generous approach” of the Court in assessing the 
admissibility of requests, which begs the question as to whether the Court “ought not now 
adopt a more rigorous approach to the matter”. The extension of the jurisdiction of the Court 
following the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as the expansion of the 
European Union in the last decade, might diminish the efficiency of  European justice. 
In 2014 there were almost 40 lawsuits in which the Court rejected requests for 
preliminary rulings due to inadmissibility or to patent absence of jurisdiction. In an equally 
significant number of lawsuits, the requests of the national judges were, in part, rejected for 
the same reasons. Orders for referral are frequently groundless in terms of the relevance of 
the European provisions relating to the referral judgment,  while  judges, on the contrary, 
often have doubts about the compatibility of national normative provisions with Union law, 
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without, however, identifying any specific EU provision as a parameter for the assessment 
of relevance. 
 The more rigorous approach assumed by the Court of Justice is founded on art. 19, 
par. 1, TEU, which designates as custodians of the respect for the judicial and jurisdictional 
systems of the EU both the Courts and the jurisdictional organs of the Member States. 
The principle of fair cooperation among judges must therefore apply in a reciprocal 
way: if the national judge is master of the evaluation of preliminary question of relevance, 
he must also be aware of the limits which the Treaties place on the scope of the Court of 
Justice. 
In these terms, the assessment of relevance, which the administrative judge has also 
reclaimed in the supreme administrative court on questions raised by the parties, necessitates 
greater care in the formulation of queries for the Court of Justice, in view of the latter's 
increased rigor in evaluating whether to accept  preliminary references.     
 
